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Educational resource. This is general guidance. It is not an official certification, a regulatory interpretation or legal advice.
Threat modeling fundamentals
The Threat Modeling Manifesto defines threat modeling as analysing representations of a system to highlight concerns about security and privacy. Its value is highest early, when a design is still cheap to change, and it should repeat as the design evolves.
Architecture understanding
Begin with an accurate diagram. Show components, data flows, data stores, external dependencies and trust boundaries. API specifications and infrastructure-as-code can be better sources than a slide drawn months ago. Mark where sensitive data lives and where identity changes hands. This also gives you a view of the attack surface: every point at which the system accepts input or exposes functionality.
Threat identification
Work through the diagram with the people who build and run the system. Ask what can go wrong at each boundary crossing, and record threats in plain language: who could do what, to which asset, with what effect.
The STRIDE methodology
| Threat | Property at risk | Example question |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Authentication | Can someone pretend to be this user or service? |
| Tampering | Integrity | Can data be changed in transit or at rest? |
| Repudiation | Non-repudiation | Could an action be denied because logs are missing? |
| Information disclosure | Confidentiality | Could data reach someone who should not see it? |
| Denial of service | Availability | Could this be overwhelmed or made unavailable? |
| Elevation of privilege | Authorisation | Could someone gain rights they should not have? |
Risk analysis
Not every threat deserves equal attention. Consider likelihood and business impact, and use a consistent scheme so that decisions can be compared across systems. CVSS is a common way to express severity, and CWE and MITRE ATT&CK help describe weaknesses and attacker techniques in shared terms.
Mitigation planning
For each significant threat, decide whether to mitigate, eliminate, transfer or accept it. Assign an owner, and put mitigation work in the same backlog as other engineering work. Record who accepted any remaining risk, and why.
Documentation
- Record the scope, the assumptions and the diagram version.
- List threats, ratings, decisions and owners.
- Note what would trigger a review, such as a new integration or a change of trust boundary.